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The liberalisation debate on water services in
Germany has become a discussion about the mod-
ernisation of the water supply. However, even this
modernisation strategy contains elements of compe-
tition as, according to the concepts of the Federal
German Ministry of Economics, it includes, inter
alia, the harmonisation of the supply of drinking
water and disposal of wastewater with respect to tax-
ation and legal aspects, the introduction of full cov-
erage benchmarking,the tasking of private third par-
ties, as well as incentives for increased co-operation
in the water industry (Auer et al. 2003). In view of
considerations on the part of the European Com-
mission,following a new legal framework for public-
private partnerships, to establish a general tendering
obligation for services of water supply and waste-
water disposal,the German water industry must now
once again face the pressure of liberalisation.
Against a backdrop of increased internationalisation
in the water industry, the question arises as to how a
change in the general framework of the free market
in Germany could have an effect on the market
structure and supply conditions. Reference points
are offered by comparisons between countries with
different types of regulation. In the following, the
organisation of the water industry in various Euro-
pean countries and the prevailing privatisation mod-
els are described,and the effects to be expected from
a liberalisation of water supply on the competitive
situation are discussed.
Basic regulatory constraints
While the term “privatisation” relates to the owner-
ship structure of the providers, the term “liberalisa-
tion” implies extensive free market ideas. Priva-
tisation involves the outsourcing of public services
from the public authorities to a privately organised
organisation (Meyer-Renschhausen 1996). In the
process nothing, however, needs to change in terms
of the market or the intensity of competition for the
commodity in question.Within the framework of pri-
vatisation,it is also possible for a public monopoly to
be transferred merely to a private monopoly. In
addition,the term “liberalisation”also refers to basic
regulatory constraints: liberalisation signifies the
cessation of limitations to competition and supply
monopolies and results in open competition between
several suppliers to attract consumers.
In the supply of drinking water, the pipe network
represents a natural monopoly but not the produc-
tion of drinking water.As drinking water is provided
in different qualities, it is not a homogenous com-
modity like electricity, for example.The operation of
the electricity network by a monopoly can be sepa-
rated from its supply by competing companies. The
transport of drinking water by competing providers is
essentially more problematic because a complete
mixing of various qualities of water would have to be
tolerated.The operation of the network and produc-
tion of drinking water can be separated from one
another only with difficulty. The public water supply
in Germany therefore, as opposed to other infra-
structure areas, is still an exception area under com-
petition law. Despite isolated privatisation of munic-
ipal water supply companies, competition does not
take place in the sense of a liberalisation of the mar-
ket. The high fixed-cost component in the supply of
water makes the laying of parallel networks by the
competing bidder unprofitable – the classical case for
a natural monopoly.This is characterised by subaddi-
tivity (i.e. a monopolist can supply the relevant mar-
ket more cost-effectively than two or more compa-
nies) as well as through the irreversibility of invest-
ments (so-called “sunk costs”). With the presence of
“sunk costs”, free entry into and departure from the
market are not possible. The relevant market is thus
not a contestable market in the sense of the theory of
“contestable markets” (Spelthahn 1993).
For the German water industry, it is characteristic
that environmental and health policy objectives are
mainly pursued via the organisation of the water
supply (provision of goods and services through re-
gional monopolies in the public domain) and less
through the employment of concrete instruments
aimed at the respective environmental political ob-
jectives (Ewers et al. 2001). The water supply com-
panies in Germany, well-known for their high quali-
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ty of drinking water, have in the past invested ca.
2.5 billion annually in a high technical standard that
has increased costs and resulted in rising prices.The
price of drinking water alone increased in the 1990s
by 40 percent and wastewater charges by 80 percent.
Therefore, with respect to municipal water, a high
potential for rationalisation was presumed, and the
question regarding operational efficiency and the
participation of private bidders in water supply com-
panies became increasingly important (Mecke 2000).
Regulation of the water supply in England, France
and Germany
A liberalisation of the water supply can take place
in different ways. The specific features depend on
what form of regulation the market for drinking
water is or should be subjected to. In an interna-
tional comparison three basic types of regulation of
natural monopolies for the public supply of water
(and disposal of wastewater) can be differentiated:
the Anglo-Saxon, the French and the German mod-
el.With all three models the aim of regulation is the
efficient production of goods and services within the
municipal water industry and their political control
(Kraemer 1997). These three basic types of regula-
tion of water supply have a specific influence on the
form of privatisation in the respective countries.As
shown below the degree of privatisation is higher
the clearer the division between supervisory bodies
and the operational business of water supply turns
out to be.
England and Wales: full privatisation
With this form of privatisation, which is found in
England and Wales, publicly operated monopolies
are transferred as a whole to a private enterprise.
Thus we speak of “full privatisation”. In this case a
sale of the operator firms, including all tangible
assets (such as, for example, pipelines, wastewater
treatment plants and water catchment systems), to
private investors takes place. In England and Wales
ten water service companies have been created in
this manner,which provide both the supply of drink-
ing water and the disposal of wastewater, and whose
shares are sold publicly (in Scotland and Northern
Ireland water supply and wastewater disposal on the
other hand are still maintained by the public author-
ities).In addition,there are 12 companies that supply
only water (OFWAT 2005). The regulation system
follows the principle of “specialised regulation”: it
consists of separate, independent advisory authori-
ties for the drawing of water and discharge of waste-
water,for the quality of drinking water and for water
prices and supply conditions:
– The Environment Agency monitors the water
quality of rivers and waters used for swimming as
well as the environmental effects of the company
activities.
– The Drinking Water Inspectorate is concerned
with the assurance of the quality of drinking water.
– The Office of Water Services (OFWAT) sets the
prices within a defined minimum and maximum,
whereby the performance of the individual
providers is evaluated.
Price regulation allows the companies to increase
their average prices per year by a factor of RPI + K,
with RPI being the retail price index and K the addi-
tional costs represented through the environmental-
ly and quality-related conditions.The regulating au-
thorities set the prices so that an efficient company
can expect a fair rate of return on its original busi-
ness capital (Kraemer 1997).
France: privatisation through delegation 
Privatisation through delegation is the temporarily
limited transfer of the responsibility for the opera-
tion of water networks to private operators as it is
practised in France.In this case the responsibility for
the water supply (as for the disposal of wastewater)
lies fundamentally with the municipalities which,
however, on the whole delegate the provision of ser-
vices to private companies.The production of goods
and services are put out to tender by the municipali-
ties,the facilities for the supply of water,on the other
hand,remain the property of the public authority. In
the contracts between the municipalities and the com-
panies it is stipulated which costs the private compa-
nies may include,as a maximum,in the bill.Three dif-
ferent forms of contract are to be found (Council of
Experts for Environmental Questions 2000):
– The franchise agreement: here the private opera-
tor takes on the costs for new investment; the
duration of the agreement is 20 to 30 years.
– The lease agreement: here the private operator
does not bear the costs for new investment, the
duration of the agreement is 10 to 15 years.
– The operating agreement: here only partial per-
formances are transferred to the private operator,
the duration of the agreement is 6 to 10 years.Thus the operation of existing water systems can be
transferred to a private company either for a rela-
tively short period with the systems generally being
retained as municipal property. On the other hand,
the construction and operation of systems to be
newly produced can be transferred to private com-
panies, whereby at the end of the period the proper-
ty is transferred to the municipality. Under a fran-
chise agreement the franchise holder builds,finances
and operates certain plants for the agreed period.He
receives a contractual remuneration, as a rule calcu-
lated according to cubic metre of water or waste-
water respectively (Kraemer 1997). In contrast to
the Anglo-Saxon privatisation model, the ownership
of tangible assets remains in the hands of the public
authorities in the French privatisation model, i.e. the
state and the municipalities or departments. Local
government is authorized to choose between direct
management or contract management. In the latter
case only the operating responsibility is delegated to
the private side.The operating licences are awarded
by means of a bidding process.
In the six river catchment areas that were formed
through the First National Water Law of 1964 two
bodies regulate each water supply:
– The Comité de Bassin (Committee of the Catch-
ment Area) and
– The Agence de l’Eau (Water Agency).
The amount of the water tariffs are determined by
the Comité de Bassin. In this body, which represents
a type of regional “water parliament”, the state, the
regions, the departments and communes, as well as
the water and surface water users are represented.
The setting of the objectives and priorities for the
various measures are documented in a water man-
agement plan. Parallel to the Agence de l’Eau, there
is a state public body that carries out the water man-
agement measures, levies charges for water usage
and water pollution, and allocates benefits for
investments and costs for treatment operations
(Langenfeld 2000).
Germany: partial privatisation with regulation by the
supervisory bodies
In Germany the privatisation debate must be viewed
against the background of a traditionally strong
municipal administration. The privatisation of the
water supply in Germany, in contrast to France and
the UK, is only one legal option but in no way a na-
tional action (Kraemer and Jäger 1997). The Ger-
man privatisation model prefers to regulate the pri-
vatised concern via its supervisory bodies. By send-
ing representatives of the public authorities into
these supervisory bodies, the business policy of the
water provider can be influenced.The fixing of prices
takes place according to the cost-covering principle.
There are basically two different forms of this type of
privatisation and one mixed form.
Formal privatisation or organisational privatisation:
In this case the task of supplying water is retained by
the previous administrator; only the operating
agency is transformed into a business form under
private law,for example by transforming a municipal
department or a semi-autonomous municipal agency
into a municipal enterprise. Despite formal privati-
sation, public structures are maintained which, how-
ever, with regard to independence and flexibility,
should approximate the management of private
companies.
Material privatisation or functional privatisation:
Here the administrator delegates his tasks to a pri-
vate party.The relinquishment of the public invento-
ry of tasks can be revocable or final (Meyer-Rensch-
hausen 1996).A regulation of the privatised compa-
ny takes place in both cases through the creation of
supervisory boards and the naming of supervisors
within the company (Kraemer 1997).
Mixed form of privatisation: Well-known in Ger-
many, the so-called “Berlin model” is a mixed form
in which private companies participate in a munici-
pal enterprise. With the partial privatisation of the
Berlin Water Works (BWB) in 1998,a holding model
was selected with which the Federal State Berlin
received 50.1 percent of the shares in the strategic
controlling holding,Berlinwasser Holding Aktienge-
sellschaft. The remaining 49.9 percent of the shares
in the Berlinwasser Holding Aktiengesellschaft was
acquired by an associated incorporated company
established by an investor consortium. The business
purpose of the Holding is the control and further
development of the competitive business and the
control of the Berlin Water Works. Thus, the legal
form of the Berlin Water Works as a corporation
under public law remained unchanged, but the com-
petitive businesses were spun off and were trans-
ferred into the Berlinwasser Holding Aktiengesell-
schaft (Mecke 2000).
The responsibility for water pollution control and
the management of surface waters in most of the
CESifo DICE Report 4/2006 44
Research ReportsCESifo DICE Report 4/2006 45
Research Reports
German Federal States is distributed over several
levels. In the larger area states these are:
– The superior water authority (as a rule the
Ministry of the Environment) with the responsi-
bility for strategic decisions.
– The upper, higher or middle water authority
which,as a rule,is assigned to the district commit-
tees or regional governments and is responsible
for the regional water management planning.
– The lower water authority (cities, towns, urban
and rural districts as well as water management
offices) with monitoring, technical advice and
executive functions.
The [German] Federal State Working Group Water
(LAWA), which was established in order to har-
monise Federal State water laws, is made up of the
superior water authorities. The Federal States have
also formed working groups for co-ordinating the
management of river basins (Mecke 2000).
In the German model the municipal corporations
and municipal public utilities are typical for the oper-
ation of the infrastructure systems necessary for the
water supply, as are the inter-municipal agencies,
which were established specifically for these tasks.
The German model functions essentially without for-
mal, external regulation of water rates, tariffs or
returns on investment.As no private enterprise prof-
it motive is present,only cost-covering rates and pub-
lic fees for the municipal water services are charged.
Market structures
In the Anglo-Saxon model the existence of a per-
manent private monopoly has been accepted up to
now. At the same time, however, efforts are being
made to minimise its negative effects through exter-
nal regulation. In England and Wales the superviso-
ry authorities set for a certain period of time upper
limits for charges to the end user.These limits allow
the company to earn a fair rate of return.The state
is thus an opposing force to the private enterprises
and has to accept an asymmetry of information as
long as it does not introduce far-reaching obliga-
tions for transparency.The advantage of this model
lies in the clear separation between the supervisory
authorities, the users of bodies of water and the
companies controlled by them and also in the fact
that the legislation and the regulation are developed
and co-ordinated at the national level (Correia and
Kraemer 1997).
In the French regulation model, an element of com-
petition at regular intervals has arisen instead of a
continuous, regulating supervision. Temporary con-
tracts between municipalities and private compa-
nies regulate the operation of municipal water ser-
vices. They include, as a rule, a complete packet of
services from the operation of the water network via
financing to strategic planning.Profits can be limited
through the competition of private bidders for the
contracts. Indeed, during the term of the contracts,
barely any competition takes place.In contrast to the
Anglo-Saxon model, the French municipalities still
have some influence on the development of their
technical municipal systems.This model leads to the
formation of large, vertically integrated water and
construction companies, which at the same time act
as operators of the systems of municipal water sup-
ply and disposal of wastewater and as supplier of rel-
evant goods and services.
The German model, on the other hand, is not a reg-
ulation model in the normal sense of the word “reg-
ulation”,as there is no external relationship between
private providers or operators and the authorities.
Instead of a control of natural monopolies from out-
side,the public authorities influence the operation of
municipal water networks through rights of owner-
ship as the municipalities are involved in the supply
companies.Information asymmetries between public
administrations and private companies therefore sel-
dom occur. The water supply companies promote a
“quasi-competition” as three out of four companies,
in accordance with the Municipal Charges Law,raise
public charges, which are approved by local govern-
ments under the supervision of the Federal States.
Here, attention is paid to the principles of cost cov-
ering and equivalence in accordance with tariff law,
which is examined in the form of price-performance
comparisons by the municipal supervisory authori-
ties. The remaining quarter of the providers raise
payments under private law and are subject to the
anti-trust control of abusive practices.The anti-trust
price control is oriented to comparative market con-
cepts and accepts price differences between
providers on the strength of clearly defined criteria
only (Grobosch 2003).
Effects on competition
In order to classify correctly the effects of different
regulating systems on the competitive structure, it is
necessary to differentiate between the municipalwater supply on the one hand and the water industry
on the other. The former falls into the category of
public services (even if they are performed by pri-
vate parties) as does municipal wastewater disposal.
The term “water industry” is, in contrast, more com-
prehensive; it includes, for example, the production
of pipes, pumps and filters as well as measuring and
control engineering equipment. Characteristic for
the German model is that the operation of the water
network is strictly separated from the production
and supply of goods associated with the services. In
contrast, global players of the international water
business operate municipal water systems and are
also producers of goods and plant for the supply of
water and disposal of wastewater.
The three privatisation models described lead to
three clearly distinguishable forms of competition:
– Yardstick-competition between private providers,
which is simulated by the regulatory authorities.
– Competition between private operators for the
right to temporary operation of natural mono-
polies.
– Competition in the goods and services markets
within the field of water.
In the Anglo-Saxon model there is no direct compe-
tition between private providers, either for the con-
sumers or for their supply areas.Yardstick-competi-
tion takes place in the form of benchmarking the
providers, which is carried out by the supervisory
authorities. The regulatory authority also requires
information on the markets for goods and services in
the field of water, because private providers and
operator companies who are also suppliers of these
goods can build up regional or
sector monopolies or cartels in
order to shift profits into non-reg-
ulated areas. This applies also to
the French model where the com-
petition for the limited operation
of local water supply monopolies
takes place in the form of a bid-
ding process. In contrast, in the
German model, there is no direct
competition between municipal
institutions; they maintain their
natural monopolies at the regio-
nal level. Performance compar-
isons between the various bidders
are made by the municipal opera-
tors themselves. On the other
hand, competition in the water
industry is intense and these markets are charac-
terised by numerous small and medium-sized com-
panies. Operators of utilities and the water industry
in Germany thus fall in essentially two groups that
are clearly separable from each other (Kraemer
1997).
In France private water supply companies were es-
tablished already in the nineteenth century: in 1853
the Société Générale des Eaux and 1880 the Lyon-
naise des Eaux. In 1933 the third largest group, the
Société d’Amenagement Urbain et Rural (SAUR),
was founded (Spelthahn 1993).Today,these business
groups and their successors have the largest shares
of the market in the international water business.
Under their umbrella all components for complex
water management projects (plant manufacture, en-
gineering, surface and subsurface civil engineering,
development departments) are part of these compe-
titively and vertically integrated international corpo-
rate groups. In the UK, the public facilities of water
supply and wastewater disposal were privatised in
1989 in a large-scale national action.Thus the Water
Service Companies were created under the umbrella
of large, regional holding-companies. Several of
these operators, such as Thames Water, Severn Trent
Water,Anglian Water and United Utilities,are active
internationally (Federal Ministry for Education and
Research 2000).
The international markets for water and waste water
services are dominated by French and British compa-
nies.The world market leaders are the French compa-
nies Suez Environnement and Veolia, each serving
around 115 million people in 2004 with drinking water
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Suez Environnement, France 92.0 62.0 115.0
Veolia, France 87.5 43.5 113.0
Thames Water, UnitedKingdom 28.0 17.8 45.0
Agbar, Spain 27.4 13.9 30.0
Saur, France 25.6 9.5 27.0
Severn Trent, United Kingdom 11.3 15.6 18.0
Azurix, USA 8.3 7.9 10.0
Anglian Water, UnitedKingdom 6.6 8.1 8.0
Berlinwasser, Germany 4.0 5.5 7.5
Gelsenwasser, Germany 6.0 3.0 7.0
Biwater, United Kingdom 3.0 6.0 5.5
Remondis Aqua, Germany 0.2 4.0 4.0
Source: Prof. Dr. K.-U. Rudolph GmbH, modified by author.CESifo DICE Report 4/2006 47
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and/or waste water services (see Table). The next
largest company is the British Thames Water with
55 million customers, which was acquired by the
German RWE Group in 2001, but sold again at the
end of 2006 to Kemble Water Limited, a consortium
led by the Australian Macquarie’s European Infra-
structure Funds (EUWID 2006). With the takeover
of Thames Water, RWE was the only German compa-
ny that succeeded in catching up with the Global
Players on the international water markets. Spanish
Agbar lags behind with 30 million customers,followed
again by French, British and US companies. The
German companies Berlinwasser and Gelsenwasser
serving 7.5 million customers and 7 million customers,
respectively, are at positions nine and ten. Remondis
Aqua serving 4 million people is at position twelve.
With the takeover of Thames Water, RWE has tem-
porarily advanced into the foremost group of global
players in the water market. Otherwise the majority
of water supply and wastewater disposal companies
in Germany is extremely small-sized, splintered and
decentralised. 6,655 water supply companies operate
17,849 facilities and around 8,000 wastewater dispos-
al companies operate more than 10,000 wastewater
treatment plants (Ewers et al.2001).Public ownership
dominates: 15 percent of the water supply companies
are managed as semi-autonomous municipal agency,
16 percent as inter-municipal agency, 6 percent as
water and soil management associations,10 percent as
public companies and 20 percent as municipal enter-
prise. 29 percent are organised in public-private part-
nership and only 3.5 percent are under a majority
controlling interest under private law. In German
wastewater management,20 percent of companies are
organised as municipal departments, 43 percent as
semi-autonomous municipal agencies, 17 percent as
public law corporations, 13 per-
cent as inter-municipal agencies
or water and soil management
associations and less than 8 per-
cent as arrangement under pri-
vate law (BGW – ATV-DVWK
2003). In Germany, there are 81
water providers per million cus-
tomers.In England and Wales,on
the other hand, there are only
0.46 and in France 0.07 compa-
nies per million customers. Some
two thirds of the German compa-
nies supply an area with between
50 and 3,000 inhabitants and
together deliver ca. 4 percent of
the total water quantity. Over 90 percent of the
amount of water, on the other hand, is delivered by
only one third of the companies (Grobosch 2003).
Water management competence in Germany is
clearly settled at the municipal level.Admittedly this
affects their ability to compete.In contrast,in France
the communes, which, in comparison with Germany,
are considerably smaller, are not in a position to
carry out the supply of drinking water themselves
due to the lack of specialist staff and knowledge
(Spelthahn 1993). An important advantage of the
structures in the German water supply is that the
strong communal anchoring of the German pro-
viders ensures a high degree of political involve-
ment.The management of surface waters thus has a
solid basis as it is oriented towards precaution. Up
until now this system has met with strong acceptance
by the general public.The high level and efficiency in
the technical management are guaranteed because
of the close co-operation between water supply com-
panies, industry and government agencies, and the
activities of technical-scientific associations that set
the rules. Due to the strong functional and organisa-
tional fragmentation, the impact of the German
water industry on the decision process in the
European Union is, however, rather small. Because
of the strong division of organisational competence
(water supply and wastewater disposal companies,
construction firms, plant constructors, component
suppliers, consulting firms, engineer offices, water
laboratories and research institutes), the German
water industry fails to create an integrated appear-
ance on the international market. As a result,
Germany cannot compete in the steadily growing
market segment of complete turnkey solutions


















EXPORTS OF EQUIPMENT FOR WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER 
DISPOSAL
Euro millioninvoicing and customer service), in which, above all,
enterprises from France and the UK dominate
(Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2000).
For France, on the other hand, the high share of the
private supply of drinking water can, to a consider-
able extent, be traced back to its historical develop-
ment. The commodity water was seen as a normal
“commercial”good and not,as in Germany,as a part
of the existing public precautions.
The argument that the German water industry has a
structural competitive disadvantage is, however, no
longer as strong if one takes into account not only
the markets for drinking water or complete solutions
but also the market for water and wastewater tech-
nology.Here Germany,with a share of world trade of
16.3 percent, takes second place after the US with a
20.1 percent share. The export quota of German
water technology rose from 26 percent in 1999 to 43
percent in 2003, and that with a company structure
characterised by small and middle-sized businesses.
On average, suppliers and producers of water pro-
cessing and wastewater treatment systems employ a
staff of 50 (Oberhäuser 2004). As US exports de-
clined, Germany was catching up in the years
1999–2003 followed by Canada with 9.3 percent and
Italy with 8.6 percent market share (see Figure).
France’s water and wastewater technology branch
follows at position 5 with a share of 7.1 percent of
world trade, followed by British companies with a
share of 5.7 percent.This suggests that the large,ver-
tically integrated water supply enterprises demon-
strate competitive weaknesses in the market seg-
ment of water and wastewater technology, because
they face too little competitive pressure in their
home markets.
Conclusions
In an international comparison,there are three basic
models for the regulation of natural monopolies in
the public water supply: the Anglo-Saxon, the
French and the German model. The delimitation
between supervisory bodies and operations in water
supply is strongest in the first and weakest in the last.
This has led to three basic types of privatisation:“full
privatisation”, “privatisation through delegation”
and “privatisation with regulation by the supervisory
bodies”.These types have led to three clearly distin-
guishable forms of competition: yardstick competi-
tion between private supply-enterprises simulated
by the regulation authorities, competition between
private operators for the right to the temporary pro-
vision of water supplies,and competition in the prod-
uct and service markets for the provision of water.
The international markets for the operation of water
supply systems and complete solutions are dominat-
ed by French and British companies. The typical
German plant constructor either does not achieve
the critical size for a global player or he lacks the
necessary references as an operator of water supply
systems. On the other hand, the water supply and
wastewater disposal operators lack the financial
power in order to compete with the world market
leaders.This disadvantage is, however, compensated
by the worldwide leading role of German water and
wastewater technology.In order for German compa-
nies also to be present on the market for complete
solutions it would be necessary to make up for a
large competitive backlog compared with foreign
water companies. To do this, the current strong mu-
nicipal anchoring of the water industry in Germany
would have to be relaxed in favour of the develop-
ment of vertically integrated water corporate groups
that can be competitive in international markets.An
adjustment of the market and concentration in the
German water sector would be the necessary pre-
requisite for such an internationalisation. However,
the structures of German water supply, proven with
regard to the safety of supply and drinking water
quality, would have to be sacrificed to achieve this
level of competition.
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